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This Article examines a recent twist in European Union (“EU”) data 
protection law. In the 1990s, the European Union was a market-creating 
organization and the law of data protection was designed to prevent rights 
abuses by market actors. Since the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and 
London, however, cooperation in law enforcement has accelerated. Now the 
challenge for the European Union is to protect privacy in its emerging system of 
criminal justice. This Article analyzes the first EU law to address data privacy in 
law enforcement—the Data Retention Directive (or “Directive”). Based on a 
detailed examination of the Directive’s legislative history, this Article finds that 
privacy—as guaranteed under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the Council of Europe’s Convention on Data Protection—is 
adequately protected in the Directive. This positive experience can serve as 
guidance for guaranteeing other fundamental rights in the rapidly expanding area 
of EU cooperation on criminal matters.  
I . INTRODUCTION 
Data privacy is one of the oldest human rights policies in the European 
Union. The European Union was born as an international organization 
dedicated to the creation of a common market. Rights emerged only gradually, 
as it became apparent that market liberalization could come into conflict with 
rights and that the safeguards available under national constitutional law were 
inadequate. At first, the European Court of Justice took the lead in establishing 
rights. By the mid-1990s, however, the European legislature had also become 
active. One of its first forays into the human rights realm was the Data 
Protection Directive.  
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The Data Protection Directive, proposed in 1990 and passed in 1995, set 
up a complex regulatory scheme at the national level to protect individual rights.1 
At that time, as was to be expected in a European Union still focused on the 
common market, data protection was aimed at preventing rights abuses by 
market actors and by government agencies operating as service providers. 
Recently, however, EU data protection has taken a new turn. Now, the challenge 
is to safeguard privacy when governments exercise their core sovereign powers 
of national security and law enforcement.  
This Article examines the European Union’s new turn toward protecting 
privacy in law enforcement activities. The first part explores the developments 
that have given rise to these policies, namely the growing importance of digital 
technologies in police investigations and the intensification of police cooperation 
in the European Union following the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and 
London. The second part analyzes the Data Retention Directive, the legislation 
with the most significant data protection ramifications to be enacted at the time 
of this writing.2 The Article concludes with some thoughts on how the largely 
positive experience of the Data Retention Directive can inform the protection of 
other classic liberal rights in the rapidly growing domain of European 
cooperation on fighting crime. 
II. LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE DIGITAL EUROPEAN AGE 
To understand the challenges of data protection today, a bit of history is 
necessary. The first European data protection laws date to the early 1970s.3 
Their focus was large-scale data collection by the government and by the few 
private actors with the resources and technology to engage in such data 
processing—mostly banks and telecommunications providers. On the public 
side, these early laws largely affected those parts of government administration 
that routinely collected large amounts of information from citizens for purposes 
of providing services such as health care, education, and welfare.  
For the most part, intelligence and law enforcement officials were 
untouched by these early data protection regulations. Under their respective 
                                                 
1  European Parliament and Council Directive 1995/46/EC, 1995 OJ (L 281) 31 (hereinafter “Data 
Protection Directive”). See generally Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: 
The Case of the European Information Privacy Network, 26 Mich J Intl L 807, 813–19, 837–45 (2005).  
2  Council Directive 2006/24/EC, 2006 OJ (L 105) 54. At the time of this writing, two other 
initiatives with far-reaching consequences for data protection were being negotiated in the 
Council: Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Protection of Personal Data Processed in the 
Framework of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, COM(05) 475 final (hereinafter 
“Proposal for Protection of Personal Data in Criminal Matters”); and Proposal for a Council 
Framework Decision on the Exchange of Information under the Principle of Availability, COM(05) 490 final. 
3  Colin J. Bennett and Charles D. Raab, The Governance of Privacy 102–03 (Ashgate 2003). 
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national laws, intelligence and law enforcement officers were generally 
prohibited from accessing without cause the records of other government 
agencies. These officers had to answer petitions from individuals seeking to 
verify that their personal data in police and security files was accurate. 
Otherwise, their information-gathering activities—eavesdropping on phone 
calls, bugging of homes, and other forms of surveillance—were covered by a 
more specific set of laws. The police had to apply for warrants from judicial 
authorities before they could undertake surveillance. In contrast, intelligence 
officers, responsible for security-related surveillance, were subject to less 
rigorous standards enforced not by courts but by independent government 
officials or parliamentary committees.4  
Since the 1970s, one development has radically altered the nature of law 
enforcement and the relationship between law enforcement and data protection 
laws—technology. Increasingly, we live our lives in digital space. We run 
errands, conduct business, and socialize with friends in the virtual world of the 
Internet. When not connected to the Web, we are on our cell phones. And, 
unbeknownst to us, our images and personal details are constantly recorded by 
surveillance cameras, security systems, and a great number of other devices. 
With this new, technology-rich lifestyle, we routinely generate millions of pieces 
of data. This data can be stored and searched with great ease. It is a treasure 
trove of information for many different types of actors: direct marketers, credit 
agencies, and especially law enforcement officers. By monitoring our Internet 
traffic, the police can easily learn where we shop, what we do in our spare time, 
and how we make a living. This is but a sampling of what can now be done with 
our electronic data, and a suggestion of what might be done in the future with 
that data.  
In this information-rich environment, the danger of government fishing 
expeditions is extreme. On a fishing expedition, investigators review 
correspondence, bills, and other personal records without any clear expectation 
of what type of evidence or what type of crime might be found. This is one of 
the most obnoxious, oppressive forms of intrusion by a government into the 
lives of its citizens. The vast quantity of data generated in today’s electronic 
world—combined with the technology available to process that data—increases 
exponentially the risk of legitimate police searches degenerating into the aimless 
perusal of our private lives. 
Old-fashioned criminal procedure cannot address the privacy challenges of 
new technologies. Under the rules of criminal procedure, before an individual’s 
                                                 
4  For a description of the German and US systems, see Paul M. Schwartz, German and US 
Telecommunications Privacy Law: Legal Regulation of Domestic Law Enforcement Surveillance, 54 Hastings L 
J 751 (2003). 
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records may be reviewed, government investigators must demonstrate to an 
independent judicial officer that they have good reason to believe that a crime 
has been committed and that a search of the individual’s records will produce 
evidence of the crime. But when the records are electronic, many believe that the 
police should not always be required to make such a showing. Even in Europe, 
where personal information such as traffic data—information on when and to 
whom emails and phone calls are sent or made—is protected under the 
fundamental right to privacy, the privacy interest in such data is perceived as less 
substantial than the privacy interest in the content of that data—an email or a 
phone conversation. What is revealed by the first type of data is thought to be 
far less significant than what is revealed by the second type. This set of beliefs is 
reflected in Europe’s legal framework. The law of data protection, not the more 
rigorous law of criminal procedure, governs police access to personal 
information such as traffic data.  
Much like criminal procedure, the law of data protection seeks to limit the 
amount of personal information available to the police in the interest of 
stopping oppressive government surveillance. But compared to criminal 
procedure the legal standards and enforcement mechanisms of European data 
protection law are more flexible. As will be explained in detail in the next 
section, under the basic principles of data protection law, personal information 
may be obtained by the police only if a number of conditions are satisfied. These 
conditions include the requirement that such information be relevant to an 
investigation, that it not be used for purposes unrelated to the investigation, and 
that it be erased or made anonymous once it no longer serves the purposes of 
the investigation. In the interests of compliance, oversight powers are vested in 
an independent privacy authority and individuals have a right to apply to 
government agencies to check on their personal information. These features of 
data protection law are geared towards many of the same liberal purposes of 
criminal procedure but without rigid legal standards such as probable cause—as 
is required for a search of a home under American criminal procedure—and 
without the courts as the principal enforcers of such standards. Of course, under 
European law, special categories of personal data are afforded additional 
protection from the police. These more demanding standards, however, do not 
apply across-the-board to all information of interest to the police. 
Before the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London, data 
protection would have been the responsibility of national legislators and the 
Council of Europe (or “Council”). Jurisdiction over police matters was still 
primarily national, with a limited oversight role for the Council of Europe.5 The 
                                                 
 
5  The Council of Europe’s oversight comes in two varieties. The Council of Europe’s Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (1981), 20 
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EU’s data protection rules were designed to regulate market actors, not the 
police. As was observed by Advocate General Léger in a recent opinion, the 
Data Protection Directive expressly does not apply to data processing for 
purposes of public security and law enforcement.6  
In the past few years, however, cooperation on criminal matters under the 
legal umbrella of the European Union has intensified. In theory, the terrorist 
attacks might have provoked no more than closer pan-European cooperation on 
fighting terrorism. Instead, these attacks have triggered cooperation on a wide 
range of law enforcement matters.7 The exchange of personal data to prevent 
and prosecute criminal acts is a critical form of such collaboration.8  
The corollary to cross-border data-sharing in the interests of EU law 
enforcement is the EU right to privacy, specifically the right to be free of 
unwarranted police surveillance. Before handing over data, evidence, or suspects, 
the police and judiciary of one state must be convinced that the police and 
judiciary of the requesting state will respect the rights of its nationals. By 
transferring such information, the police and judiciary of one state put their 
citizens at risk of being investigated, tried, and imprisoned in another state. This 
requires a great deal of confidence in the fairness of the requesting state’s 
criminal justice system. In recent years, therefore, a number of attempts have 
                                                                                                                              
ILM 317, contains rules applicable to private and public actors, including the police. The 
Convention establishes a committee of representatives of the signatory parties, whose mission is 
to oversee implementation. Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has been interpreted to include the right to protection of 
personal data; individuals can seek a remedy before the European Court of Human Rights if they 
believe that their data protection rights have been breached. See Rotaru v Romania, App No 
28341/95, 8 BHRC 449 (May 4, 2000) (holding that storage and use of personal information in 
police files, together with refusal of right of correction, amounts to interference with private life 
under Article 8); Leander v Sweden, App No 9248/81, 9 Eur HR Rep 433, 450 ¶ 48 (Mar 26, 1987) 
(holding that recording of personal details in police files constitutes interference with private life 
under Article 8); Malone v The United Kingdom, App No 8691/79, 7 Eur HR Rep 14, 49 ¶ 84 (Aug 2, 
1984) (holding that pen registers constitute an interference with private life under Article 8); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), 
art 8, 213 UN Treaty Ser 221 (1955) (“ECHR”).  
6  Opinion of Advocate General Léger, European Parliament v Council and v Commission, Cases 317/04 
and 318/04, ¶ 96 (2006), available online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004C0317:EN:HTML> (visited Apr 21, 2007). 
7  See Jörg Monar, The Problems of Balance in EU Justice and Home Affairs and the Impact of 11 September, 
in Malcolm Anderson and Joanna Apap, eds, Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European 
Borders 165, 177–80 (Kluwer 2002). 
8  See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Towards Enhancing 
Access to Information by Law Enforcement Agencies, COM(04) 429 final.  
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been made to set down a common rights framework for the European Union’s 
criminal justice system.9 Data protection is one piece of that rights package.  
III. THE DATA RETENTION DIRECTIVE 
On March 15, 2006, the European Parliament (or “Parliament”) and the 
Council of the European Union passed the Data Retention Directive.10 Its aim 
was to facilitate European cooperation in criminal investigations. Under the 
Directive, providers of electronic communications services and networks are 
required to keep traffic data related to phone calls and emails for a period of six 
months to two years, depending on the Member State.11 This traffic data 
includes the information necessary to identify the originator and the recipient of 
phone calls (including Internet telephony) and emails, together with information 
on the time, date, and duration of these phone calls and emails.12 Such data must 
be made available to the national police and through the national police, as well 
as to police officers in other Member States in accordance with the requirements 
of their respective national laws.13  
Such a directive was necessary because unlike the United States, where 
communications providers routinely store such information for marketing 
purposes,14 communications providers in many European countries have been 
legally required for decades to erase such information as soon as it is no longer 
useful for billing purposes.15 In the wake of the terrorist attacks, police 
authorities became convinced that such information was indispensable to 
fighting crime. A law, therefore, was needed to reverse the presumption in favor 
of information destruction. 
A. THE LAW-MAKING PROCESS 
The Data Retention Directive’s procedural history was rocky. The first 
complication stemmed from confusion over whether the law should be passed 
pursuant to the European Union’s single-market powers, known as the First 
Pillar, or pursuant to its crime-fighting powers, known as the Third Pillar. As 
                                                 
9  See, for example, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on Certain Procedural Rights in Criminal 
Proceedings throughout the European Union, COM (04) 328 final. 
10  Council Directive at 54 (cited in note 2).  
11  Id, arts 3, 6. 
12  Id, art 5. 
13  Id, arts 1, 4, 8. 
14  Mark Hosenball and Evan Thomas, Hold the Phone; Big Brother Knows Whom You Call. Is that Legal, 
and Will it Help Catch the Bad Guys?, Newsweek 22 (May 22, 2006). 
15  See, for example, Council Directive 2002/58/EC, art 6, 2002 OJ (L 201) 37. 
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mentioned earlier, the European Union was originally conceived as a market-
creating organization. Only in 1992 did it obtain the power to pursue a common 
foreign and security policy and to act on matters of criminal law. At that time, 
the powers relating to the single market became known as the First Pillar, those 
relating to common foreign and security policy as the Second Pillar, and those 
relating to criminal law as the Third Pillar. Defense policy and criminal law, 
however, go to the core of national sovereignty and therefore the powers 
conferred by the Second and Third Pillars were far more limited than those of 
the First Pillar.  
The Directive could have plausibly been passed under either the First or 
the Third Pillar. Its principal aim was to promote cooperation among law 
enforcement communities by improving the information available to the police. 
Yet the initiative also had a single-market effect. By standardizing the data 
retention requirements imposed by police authorities on electronic 
communications providers, it would be easier for providers to do business in 
multiple jurisdictions. Rather than having to comply with the laws of twenty-
seven different EU Member States (“Member States”), communications 
providers would be able to rely on a single data retention standard for all of their 
European operations.  
The choice of the Directive’s legal basis mattered because of the less 
supranational character of the Third Pillar as compared to the First Pillar. A 
Third Pillar measure could be proposed by single Member States, whereas a First 
Pillar measure could only be proposed by the European Commission (or 
“Commission”). To pass a Third Pillar measure, unanimity in the Council would 
be necessary, whereas to pass a First Pillar measure, only a qualified majority 
would be required. For a Third Pillar measure, the European Parliament would 
only be consulted, but under the First Pillar, the European Parliament would 
enjoy full legislative prerogatives in accordance with the co-decision procedure. 
Moreover, the European Court of Justice’s jurisdiction over a Third Pillar 
measure is narrower than over a First Pillar measure.16
Initially, the measure was proposed by France, Ireland, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom as a framework decision under the Third Pillar.17 A year later, 
                                                 
 
16  See Treaty on European Union, art 35, 2002 OJ (C 325) 5 (Feb 7, 1992) (hereinafter “Treaty on 
European Union”). For the Court of Justice to have jurisdiction over preliminary rulings from 
national courts concerning Third Pillar measures, the Member State must enter a declaration. By 
2005, fourteen out of twenty-five Member States had acceded to the Court of Justice’s 
jurisdiction. See Information Concerning the Declarations by the French Republic and the Republic of Hungary 
on their Acceptance of the Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to Give Preliminary Rulings on the Acts Referred to 
in Article 35 of the Treaty on European Union, 2005 OJ (L 327) 19. 
17  Draft Framework Decision on the Retention of Data Processed and Stored in Connection with the Provision of 
Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or Data on Public Communications Networks for the 
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however, the Council and the Commission reversed course, and the measure 
was proposed by the Commission as a First Pillar directive.18 The Directive was 
finally passed in March 2006 on that same legal basis.19 Ultimately, the more 
democratic co-decision procedure under the First Pillar appeared better suited to 
deal with an issue with implications for a fundamental right—the right to 
personal data protection.  
A second complication was the variety of data protection institutions with 
a right of consultation. Two separate data protection authorities gave opinions 
on the proposed directive. While the opinion of the first was expected,20 the 
other came as somewhat of a surprise.21 The first authority, the Data Protection 
Working Party (“Working Party”), is composed of national data protection 
officials. It was established in 1995 to advise on implementation of the Data 
Protection Directive and on new data protection initiatives proposed for the 
European Community.22 Since then it has routinely issued opinions, sometimes 
at the request of the Commission, on legislative initiatives with data protection 
ramifications.  
                                                                                                                              
Purpose of Prevention, Investigation, Detection and Prosecution of Crime and Criminal Offences Including 
Terrorism, Council Doc 8958/04 (Apr 28, 2004) (“Draft Framework Decision”), available online at 
<http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/apr/8958-04-dataret.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007). 
18  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Retention of Data Processed in 
Connection with the Provision of Public Electronic Communication Services and Amending Directive 
2002/58/EC, COM(05) 438 final (“Commission Proposal”). The legal basis for the proposed and 
the final versions of the directive was the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art 95, 
1997 OJ (C340) 3 (Nov 10, 1997).  
19  On July 6, 2006, Ireland brought a legal challenge to the Data Retention Directive on the grounds 
that it should have been passed under the Third Pillar, not the First Pillar. See Ireland v Council of 
the European Union, European Parliament, Case C-301/06, 2006 OJ (C 237) 5 (case pending).  
20  See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 9/2004, available online at <http:// 
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp99_en.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 
2007) (“Working Party”); Working Party, Opinion 4/2005, available online at <http:// 
ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp113_en.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 
2007); Working Party, Opinion 3/2006, available online at <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/wp119_en.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007). 
21  See Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the Retention of Data Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public 
Electronic Communication Services and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2005 OJ (C 298) 1 (“Opinion 
of European Data Protection Supervisor”).  
22  See Data Protection Directive, art 29 (cited in note 1). Formally, the Working Party’s jurisdiction 
extends only as far as that of the Directive, namely initiatives for the European Community (the 
First Pillar). Id, art 30. However, the Working Party also gives opinions on initiatives in the Third 
Pillar. This practice appears to have been ratified and codified in the proposed Framework 
Decision on data protection in the Third Pillar, with the creation of a working party with a nearly 
identical composition and set of powers. See Proposal for Protection of Personal Data in 
Criminal Matters, art 31 (cited in note 2). 
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The other authority—the European Data Protection Supervisor (“Data 
Protection Supervisor”)—is a more recent body, created in 2001 to oversee the 
use of personal data by European Community institutions.23 For the most part, 
the Data Protection Supervisor was conceived as a functional equivalent to the 
data protection authorities responsible for government oversight at the national 
level. It was to be responsible, inter alia, for: receiving notifications of data 
processing by European Community institutions like the European Commission; 
checking that such data processing was lawful; enforcing, with sanctions if 
necessary, the data protection rules; hearing individual complaints of wrongful 
data processing; and advising European Community bodies on their more 
specific data protection administrative rules.24 Strictly speaking, the Data 
Protection Supervisor did not have jurisdiction over data processing at the 
national level nor did he have a right of consultation on directives regulating 
national data processing. Nevertheless, at the same time the Data Retention 
Directive was proposed, the European Commission requested an opinion from 
the Data Protection Supervisor.25 Therefore, two sets of opinions informed the 
debate on the Directive. 
Was data privacy adequately protected under the Data Retention Directive? 
As we shall see, the views of the different institutional actors were radically 
opposed on this question. While the Working Party and the Data Protection 
Supervisor unequivocally condemned the initial version of the Directive and 
remained skeptical of the final version, the Council, the Commission, and the 
European Parliament judged the privacy guarantees in the final version 
satisfactory.  
B. THE RIGHTS ANALYSIS 
The best place to begin the analysis of the Data Retention Directive for 
compliance with the right to data privacy—and where European policymakers 
began their analysis—is the European Convention on Human Rights 
(“ECHR”).26 Although the European Union is not a party to the ECHR, it is 
well-established under treaty law and case law that ECHR rights are guaranteed 
in the European Union.27 Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to private 
life. An additional set of guarantees, specific to data privacy and critical to this 
analysis, are contained in Council of Europe Convention 108 (“Convention 
                                                 
23  Council Regulation 45/2001, 2001 OJ (L 8) 1. 
24  Id, art 46.  
25  See Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor, recitals, ¶ 5 (cited in note 21). 
26  See note 5. 
27  Treaty on European Union, art 6(2) (cited in note 16). 
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108”).28 Again, although the European Union is not a party to Convention 108, 
all the EU Member States are parties. Moreover, Convention 108 served as the 
main point of reference for the Data Protection Directive.  
These legal standards are complex and allow for significant variation in 
national data protection regimes. For purposes of this analysis, however, the 
standards can be summarized as follows. Under the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, the storing and 
processing of personal data for purposes of fighting crime constitutes an 
interference with the right to private life under Article 8 of the ECHR.29 
Nevertheless, this data processing is permissible if it satisfies three conditions. 
First, if the processing is done by a public authority or for a public purpose, it 
must be authorized by a law, accessible to the public, with precise enough 
provisions to curb arbitrary government action and to put citizens on notice of 
possible incursions into their private sphere.30 Second, the purpose of the 
interference must be legitimate. Namely, the purpose must be related to one of 
the categories recognized under Article 8. It must be “in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”31 Third, the interference 
with private life must be proportional. Proportionality is comprised of two 
elements: a search for alternative, less rights-burdensome government means of 
accomplishing the public purpose and an assessment, not always explicit, of the 
importance of the right as compared to the public purpose.32 If the right is 
sufficiently important and there are alternative means of accomplishing the 
public purpose, proportionality is breached.  
1. Authorization by Law 
These steps in the privacy rights analysis were debated by the many 
institutional players involved in drafting the Data Retention Directive. The entire 
                                                 
28  Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data, Council of Europe Treaties No 108 (Jan 28, 1981), available online at <http:// 
conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/108.htm> (visited Apr 21, 2007) (hereinafter 
“Convention 108”). 
29  See Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor at 2, ¶ 9 (cited in note 21). 
30  See, for example, Amann v Switzerland, App No 27798/95, 30 Eur HR Rep 843, 858 ¶ 50 (2000), 
available online at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table= 
F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=1078&sessionId=10122313&skin=hudoc-
en&attachment=true> (visited Apr 21, 2007). 
31  ECHR, art 8 (cited in note 5). 
32  See, for example, Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 46 (Duke 2d ed 1997). 
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initiative turned on the need to provide a legal basis for the retention of traffic 
data by private telecommunications providers. Without this, there would be no 
law authorizing the interference with private life and, as a result, all those 
involved—communications providers, national police, Member States, and the 
European Union—would be in breach of their duties under Article 8 of the 
ECHR. The legal basis contained in the Data Retention Directive would replace 
divergent national laws specifying the circumstances under which 
communication providers were required to retain data for law enforcement 
purposes.33 On this, all of the institutional actors—Council, Commission, 
Parliament, Working Party, and Data Protection Supervisor—were in agreement.  
They strongly disagreed, however, on whether the Data Retention 
Directive should also serve as the basis, in law, for police access to traffic data. 
In other words, should the Directive set down the conditions under which the 
police would be able to request the retained data from communications 
providers? This difference turned on the seemingly technical issue of whether 
data retention should be categorized as a Third Pillar or a First Pillar policy. 
Once the choice was made to go ahead with the Directive as a First Pillar 
initiative, the Commission and the Council took the position that, legally 
speaking, the Directive could not regulate police access to communications data. 
Anything having to do with the police was strictly Third Pillar. The Working 
Party, the Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Parliament took the 
opposite position.34 This was unsurprising because their institutional clout on the 
question of police access depended on it. If the issue were regulated nationally, 
or under the Third Pillar, the power of these supranational institutions would be 
minimal. Ultimately, a provision on police access was included.35 The substance 
of this provision, however, is skeletal compared to what the Parliament, 
following the lead of the two advisory bodies, had requested. 
Related to the choice between the First and the Third Pillar was the debate 
over the appropriate institutional process for bringing the Directive into line, in 
                                                 
33  Since a directive must be implemented at the national level, there are still national laws. However, 
the room for variation among those national laws has been reduced considerably.  
34  See Working Party, Opinion 4/2005 at 8 (cited in note 20); Opinion of Data Protection Supervisor 
at 3 ¶ 14, 11 ¶ 80 (cited in note 21). The Parliament, in agreement with these two data protection 
advisory bodies, proposed a series of amendments giving effect to their recommendations. See 
Parliament Legislative Resolution, Eur Parl Doc (P6_TA (2005) 0512) 1 (Dec 14, 2005) 
(approving amended version of the Retention Directive), available online at 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?objRefId=105467&language=MT> (visited 
Apr 21, 2007); Report on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Retention of Data Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public Electronic Communication Services and 
Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, Eur Parl Doc (A6-0365/2005) 14, 15–16, 33–34 (2005) 
(“Parliament Report”).  
35  Council Directive, art 4 (cited in note 2). 
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the future, with changing technological and social realities. In the Commission 
proposal, revisions to the types of traffic data to be retained were to be made by 
an administrative process: a regulatory comitology committee, which in practice 
meant close supervision of the Commission’s rulemaking by the Council.36 The 
data protection bodies and the Parliament objected. For an issue with such far-
reaching implications for fundamental rights they advocated the full-blown 
legislative procedure of co-decision, under which the Parliament would have a 
right to vote. In the view of the Parliament and the data protection bodies, 
Europe’s only directly elected legislative body should be entitled to decide.37 
Ultimately, the position shared by the data protection bodies and the Parliament 
prevailed. 
This division between the Council and the Commission on the one hand, 
and the Parliament and the data protection bodies on the other, was driven not 
by the need to enact a law authorizing the interference with the right to privacy, 
but by different views of which type of law was most legitimate. Under Article 8 
of the ECHR, any national or EU law is satisfactory as long as it is precise and 
accessible to the public.38 The debate, therefore, was not about rights but about 
the nature of EU democracy. In the view of the Council and the Commission, 
national ministries of the interior, sitting on the Council, should alone decide on 
the privacy safeguards to be respected by the police. The unanimity requirement, 
which gives each state a veto right, together with the power of national 
parliaments to supervise their executives, would ensure that the decisions of the 
Council would respect the will of European electorates. By contrast, the 
European Parliament and the data protection authorities argued that the 
Council, together with the Parliament, should decide on the privacy safeguards 
to be put into place. In their view, as a directly elected, democratic body, the 
European Parliament would improve the deliberative, rights-abiding quality of 
the law. But even though this position might have surface appeal, the correct 
outcome is far from self-evident. Many believe that the European Parliament is 
more removed from the European people than the national governments that sit 
on the Council and the national parliaments that hold their governments in 
check. If this is indeed true, then the Council, not the European Parliament, is 
the more democratic legislator.  
                                                 
36  See Commission Proposal, arts 5, 6 (cited in note 18). 
37  See Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor ¶ 60 (cited in note 21); Working Party, 
Opinion 4/2005 at 9 (cited in note 20); Parliament Report at 34 (cited in note 34).  
38  Under German constitutional law, by contrast, government action that interferes with certain 
types of basic rights must be taken pursuant to parliamentary statute. See Sabine Michalowski and 
Lorna Woods, German Constitutional Law: The Protection of Civil Liberties 80–81 (Ashgate 1999). 
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In sum, the Data Retention Directive was enacted to comply with the first 
condition of data privacy: any interference, including the retention and use of 
traffic data to assist with criminal investigations, had to be authorized by law. 
But the debates that emerged over the form of law to be used were focused on a 
very different set of concerns. For some, the Council was the repository of 
legitimacy and for others it was the European Parliament. While the decision to 
regulate only minimally the terms of police access represented a victory for the 
Council position, the choice of a co-decision legislative process to revise the list 
of traffic data represented a victory for the Parliament’s position. 
2. Legitimate Purpose  
The institutions also debated the second step of the rights analysis: 
legitimate purpose. To satisfy Article 8 of the ECHR, the retention requirement 
had to advance a legitimate purpose. At the beginning of the legislative debate, 
the purpose of data retention was quite broad. In the Council’s draft, the data 
was to be used to fight all crimes. Moreover, it was to be used not only to 
investigate and to prosecute past crime, but to prevent future crimes.39 In the 
Commission’s proposal, the crimes were paired down to “serious criminal 
offences, such as terrorism and organised crime.”40 In the final version, the 
purpose was further narrowed: prevention of crime was stricken from the text. 
Thus the provision now reads: “The Directive aims to harmonise Member 
States’ provisions . . . for the purpose of the investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national 
law.”41 The decision to limit the use of traffic data to serious criminal offenses 
and to exclude crime prevention can be traced to the Working Party and the 
European Parliament. Both were extremely critical of the nearly unfettered rights 
of access that such broad purposes would confer upon police authorities.42
Notice, however, that the debate did not focus on the legitimacy of the 
government purpose. Under Article 8 of the ECHR, the use of data to fight any 
type of crime is considered legitimate. Even the original Council proposal would 
have satisfied this part of the analysis. Rather, the debate was driven by the logic 
of the proportionality test: the greater the importance of the government’s 
purpose, the more deference should be afforded government actors in deciding 
the rights-burdening means by which such a purpose will be accomplished. In 
the eyes of the data protection advocates, such a massive data retention program 
                                                 
39  Draft Framework Decision, art 1 (cited in note 17). 
40  Commission Proposal, art 1 (cited in note 18). 
41  Council Directive, art 1(1) (cited in note 2). 
42  See Working Party, Opinion 4/2005 at 8 (cited in note 20); Parliament Report at 33 (cited in note 
34). 
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could be justified only by the need to catch the perpetrators of serious crimes 
and the perpetrators of crimes that were certain, not speculative. 
3. Proportionality 
Proportionality proved to be the thorniest issue of all. The proportionality 
test has many different formulations, depending on the court and the 
commentator.43 Even in the same court and on the same panel, the test can be 
articulated differently.44 At the very least, however, the following questions must 
be addressed: Is there evidence that government action can achieve the stated 
purpose? Is the government action necessary for accomplishing the stated 
purpose or would alternative means accomplish the same purpose with a lesser 
burden on the privacy right?45 The burden of justification under the 
proportionality test lies with the government and varies tremendously, 
depending on the right at stake and the public interest being pursued: the more 
important the right, the higher the burden on the government; and the more 
important the public purpose, the lower the burden on the government.46
When the privacy right at stake is data protection, the proportionality 
investigation is guided by some of the more specific guarantees of Convention 
108.47 Since every instance in which data traceable to an individual is collected 
and processed is considered an intrusion into private life, all such data must be 
“adequate” and “relevant” to accomplishing the government purpose.48 To 
ensure that personal data processing can accomplish the government’s purpose, 
such data must be “accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date.”49 The 
                                                 
43  See, for example, Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms 79–82, 243–
44 (Oxford 2004); Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 371–79 
(Oxford 3d ed 2002). 
44  For instance, compare the different versions of the proportionality test in the majority opinion in 
Leyla Şahin v Turkey, App No 44774/98, 2005-XI Eur Ct HR, ¶ 71 (2005), available online at 
<http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB861
42BF01C1166DEA398649&key=11423&sessionId=10122336&skin=hudoc-en&attachment= 
true> (visited Apr 21, 2007), with the dissent in Leyla Şahin v Turkey, App No 44774/98, 2005-XI 
Eur Ct HR, ¶ A1 (2005) (Tulkens, J dissenting), available online at <http:// 
cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkp197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C
1166DEA398649&key=11423&sessionId=10122336&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true> 
(visited Apr 21, 2007). 
45  A third common element of the proportionality inquiry—although employed generally only when 
the burdened right is a non-economic right—is whether, even in the face of the necessity of the 
measure for accomplishing the purpose, the right trumps the government action. Kommers, 
Constitutional Jurisprudence at 46 (cited in note 32). 
46  See Opinion of Advocate General Léger ¶¶ 228–30 (cited in note 6). 
47  Convention 108 (cited in note 28). 
48  Id, art 5(c). 
49  Id, art 5(d). 
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amount of data processed and the time during which it is stored should be no 
more than necessary to accomplish this purpose.50 Moreover, security 
precautions must be taken to guarantee that the data is used only by those 
entities and for those purposes for which it was collected originally.51 Finally, as 
a special safeguard for the privacy right, individuals should have the right to 
check their personal data to make sure that it is accurate and that, in all other 
respects, it is being processed in accordance with the law.  
Neither the Working Party nor the Data Protection Supervisor believed 
that lawmakers had satisfied the proportionality test. On the first question—
whether data retention could accomplish the crime-fighting purpose—the two 
data protection bodies were skeptical. Neither believed that lawmakers had 
demonstrated with enough certainty that communications data over six months 
old would be useful in investigating crimes.52 In other words, they did not 
believe that the legislature had shown that the government measure could 
achieve the stated crime-fighting result. The evidence in favor of data retention 
was drawn largely from figures provided by the United Kingdom on police 
requests for communications data.53 According to these figures, traffic data older 
than six months was often useful in investigating serious crimes. Both data 
protection bodies dismissed this evidence as inadequate.54 European legislators, 
however, were persuaded otherwise, as demonstrated by the enactment of the 
Data Retention Directive. 
The most divisive aspect of the proportionality debate lay elsewhere: the 
length of the data retention period and the amount of data to be retained. Was it 
truly necessary to keep so much traffic data for so long to accomplish the crime-
fighting purpose? The original Council proposal would have required data 
retention for a period of one to three years.55 In other words, in their 
implementing legislation, Member States could have chosen anything from a 
one- to a three-year data retention period. For some, this period was 
disproportionate and excessive in light of the measure’s burden on the privacy 
right. Responding to this criticism, the Commission reduced the data retention 
period considerably. The proposed directive would have required call data to be 
                                                 
50  Id, art 5(c); Id, art 5(e) (referring to storage time).  
51  Id, art 7.  
52  See Note from Council Presidency to COREPER/JHA Council, Council Doc 15220/05, 2 (Dec 
1, 2005) (on limiting purpose to fighting serious crime); Opinion of European Data Protection 
Supervisor ¶ 27 (cited in note 21) (on eliminating crime prevention); Working Party, Opinion 
4/2005 at 6 (cited in note 20) (on eliminating crime prevention).  
53  Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor ¶ 16 (cited in note 21).  
54  Id ¶¶ 16, 61; Working Party, Opinion 9/2004 at 4 (cited in note 20). 
55  See Draft Framework Decision, art 4 (cited in note 17). 
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retained for one year, and email and voice-over Internet protocol data to be 
retained for six months.56 After negotiations in the Council, however, the 
retention period in the final version was lengthened to between six months to 
two years for all data. In this political compromise between the security-minded 
officials in the Council and the data protection advocates in the oversight bodies 
and the Parliament, the difference was split exactly in two: one year shorter than 
the Council’s initial position, one year longer than the Parliament’s position.  
As for the amount of data to be retained, it was clear from the very 
beginning that the Data Retention Directive would not cover content data.57 
Communications providers would not be given a mandate to create vast 
databases of telephone conversations and email correspondence that could then 
be tapped by law enforcement officials. Also, at the very beginning, legislators 
settled on six categories of traffic data to be gathered: (1) data on the source of 
the communication, such as the telephone number originating the call; (2) data 
on the destination of the communication, such as the telephone number 
receiving the call; (3) data on the date, time, and duration of the communication; 
(4) data on the type of communication—namely whether it was a phone call, a 
voicemail message, a text message, an email, or a voice-over Internet protocol; 
(5) data necessary to identify the equipment used by the parties to the 
communication; and (6) data necessary to identify the location of mobile 
equipment such as cell phones for the duration of the communication.58  
Later, however, two points of contention over data content emerged. Some 
of those involved in the legislative debate argued that a call that was made, but 
not answered, should be considered a “communication” and therefore be 
retained. Some of the institutions also pushed for location data on mobile 
equipment such as cell phones to be collected for the entire call, enabling the 
police not only to monitor calls, but also to track the movements of individuals. 
The Working Party, on the other hand, recommended retention only for 
successful calls and only for the location of mobile devices at the beginning of 
the call.59 The European Parliament in essence adopted the Working Party’s 
recommendation.60 The Council and the Commission, however, successfully 
resisted this recommendation. In the final version of the Directive, data on 
                                                 
56  Commission Proposal, art 7 (cited in note 18). The Commission’s position was largely satisfactory 
to the data protection bodies and the European Parliament. See Opinion of European Data 
Protection Supervisor at 11, ¶ 83 (cited in note 21); Working Party, Opinion 4/2005 at 6–7 (cited in 
note 20); Parliament Report at 22, 35 (cited in note 34).  
57  See Draft Framework Decision, art 1(2) (cited in note 17). 
58  See id, art 2(2); Commission Proposal at Annex (cited in note 18). 
59  Working Party, Opinion 4/2005 at 10 (cited in note 20). 
60  Parliament Report at 35 (cited in note 34). 
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unsuccessful calls and on the location of mobile equipment throughout the call 
must be retained.61
As explained earlier, the proportionality inquiry can turn on the existence 
of an equally feasible and equally effective government measure with a lower 
burden on the privacy right. According to the data protection watchdogs, 
retaining less data for a shorter time was one such government measure. But 
they also had in mind another, less privacy-burdening means of getting the 
traffic data necessary to catch criminals: a “quick-freeze procedure.”62 Under this 
procedure, when the police have a suspect in mind, yet still do not have evidence 
that would satisfy the standard for obtaining a court warrant, they can ask 
communications providers to store that person’s communications data. If at a 
later point the police do have the evidence necessary for a court warrant, they 
can obtain access to the data. This alternative, however, did not surface in any 
other parts of the legislative history, and it does not appear to have been taken 
seriously by the other institutional players.  
C. IS PRIVACY ADEQUATELY PROTECTED? 
With this understanding of the legislative debates underpinning the Data 
Retention Directive, the question posed earlier can now be addressed: Will the 
Data Retention Directive adequately protect privacy? Overall, the answer is yes. 
Two critical aspects of the Directive support this conclusion: the type of law that 
serves as the basis for the interference with the right to privacy, and the 
measure’s proportionality.  
1. Type of Law  
With the Data Retention Directive, an accessible, detailed, and 
democratically enacted law serves as the basis for personal data processing by 
communications providers. Police access to communications data is also based 
on accessible, detailed, and democratically enacted laws, albeit laws that are 
scattered among various sources—the Data Retention Directive, national laws 
regulating police surveillance of electronic communications, and, once 
agreement is reached in the Council, an EU law protecting personal data in 
police cooperation on criminal matters.63 In addition, any future changes to data 
retention duties, even those changes that appear merely technical and 
administrative, will have to be made through the democratic process.  
                                                 
61  See Council Directive, arts 3(2) (retention of unsuccessful call attempts), 5(f)(2) (location data) 
(cited in note 2). 
62  See Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor ¶ 20 (cited in note 21); Working Party, 
Opinion 4/2005 at 6 (cited in note 20).  
63  Proposal for Protection of Personal Data in Criminal Matters (cited in note 2). 
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The decision to go forward under the First Pillar was salutary. Of course, 
this was not strictly necessary under the European right to privacy. Any rule that 
is detailed and available to the public satisfies the requirements of the ECHR. 
Yet the involvement of a directly elected legislature improves the transparency 
of rights-burdening rules, thus promoting the goals underlying the requirement 
of authorization by law. Indeed, under German constitutional law, only the 
German Parliament may enact laws that intrude upon basic rights. Giving the 
European Parliament co-decision powers meant that the decision to amass huge 
amounts of personal data concerning ordinary citizens was more visible and was 
debated more vigorously than it otherwise would have been. Additionally, the 
Council’s burden of justification for this data-gathering initiative was more 
substantial once the matter had to be decided by the Parliament. In other words, 
involving the European Parliament had the great merit of putting data retention 
and its privacy implications in the public eye. Furthermore, even though it is 
difficult to prove with any degree of certainty, some of the changes in the final 
version seem to have been the product of this higher burden of explanation. It 
appears that once the Council was forced to explain the more intrusive aspects 
of the proposed directive, it backed down. The Council concluded that routine 
law enforcement methods, as opposed to privacy-invading retention of 
communications data, would suffice for ordinary crimes like theft. The Council 
also decided that communications data over two years old would not be 
particularly useful to the police because those plotting a serious crime like a 
terrorist attack could be expected to communicate at some time within the two 
years leading up to the attack.  
It certainly is true that even when the Council alone enacts legislation 
under the Third Pillar, it is subject to democratic checks: the European 
Parliament is consulted and national governments that sit in the Council must 
answer to their national parliaments, some of which can be very exacting. 
Moreover, under the Third Pillar, the voting rule is unanimity, meaning that each 
government must consent to every measure. Yet, the actual experience with 
democracy via national parliaments’ control of their governments has been 
disappointing. The basic difficulty is that as an issue is being negotiated among 
governments, those governments demand secrecy, and after the issue has been 
decided, the intergovernmental bargains can be unraveled only at considerable 
cost. Giving the European Parliament real powers is one of the easiest ways of 
overcoming the shortcomings of national parliamentary control in the 
supranational, European context.  
The Working Party and the Data Protection Supervisor also improved the 
quality of the deliberative process. This was because of their expertise on privacy 
issues, as well as their experience with comparable national legislation on data 
retention. Based on this background knowledge, the two data protection bodies 
could easily spot the shortcomings of the data retention initiative. Their 
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familiarity with the policy area also enabled them to suggest policy alternatives to 
the proposals of the Council and the Commission. It is not surprising that most 
of their recommendations made their way into the Parliament’s amendments. 
Few parliamentarians can be expected to have experience with data protection; 
to protect privacy rights, the Parliament naturally looked to these two 
independent data protection watchdogs for guidance.  
2. Proportionality 
The data retention scheme also satisfied the demands of proportionality. A 
maximum retention period of two years appears reasonable. It takes time to plan 
certain types of crimes, and it is not unthinkable that, even two years before the 
event, the conspiracy might have begun to take shape and leave communications 
traces. In this respect, the data protection watchdogs were overly severe. As 
recounted earlier, they wanted solid, social scientific proof of the usefulness of 
communications data over six months old. This, however, was unrealistic. Such 
certainty is hard to give in the face of rapidly changing technologies—changes 
that affect both how electronic communications can be used to commit crimes 
and how the police can use communications records to combat crime. In a 
similar vein, it was impractical for the watchdogs to insist on proof that their 
favorite policy alternative—the quick-freeze procedure—would be less effective 
in fighting crime than data retention. Certainly, this discussion of alternative law 
enforcement techniques was extremely valuable. But, again, in light of the 
technological uncertainties and the importance of protecting public security, the 
expectations of the data protection watchdogs were set too high.  
Like the maximum retention period of two years, the amount of personal 
data to be retained also appears reasonable. The main dispute in this regard was 
over data relating to unsuccessful calls. In the final text, data on such calls must 
be retained. It is difficult for the layperson to know the value of information on 
calls made, but not answered, by a suspected criminal. Perhaps, since only calls 
involving at least two parties can count as evidence of a conspiracy, only 
completed calls are helpful in investigating crimes. Yet an unsuccessful call 
might indicate to the police that the two parties conspired in the real, non-digital 
world. And with caller identification, even a call that goes unanswered is capable 
of communicating information to a co-conspirator. Although certainly not 
foolproof, these arguments in favor of retention are at least plausible.  
The Data Retention Directive’s provisions on record-keeping contribute to 
the proportionality of the measure. Under the Directive, the Member States 
must provide yearly figures on the number of times that traffic data is 
transferred to the police, the age of the transferred data, and the number of 
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instances in which police requests for data could not be satisfied.64 Good 
documentation on police use of communications data enables future legislators 
to determine whether the data in fact contributes to fighting crime. It gives 
legislators the tools to assess, over time and in light of national experience, 
whether such information does indeed improve public security. This provision 
could have required national police to collect more detailed information—for 
instance to break down data by the type of electronic communications involved. 
However, in light of the limits on the bureaucratic resources that can be devoted 
to such information-gathering initiatives, the record-keeping provision is a 
valuable first step. If it were to emerge that communications data over a year old 
are hardly ever used, then it would be appropriate to consider the data retention 
program disproportionate and to amend the Directive.  
Critical to this assessment of the Data Retention Directive’s proportionality 
are the different privacy safeguards contained in the Directive. The investigation 
of ordinary crimes and crime prevention were eliminated as acceptable uses of 
personal data. Moreover, the duties of communications providers are laid down 
in some detail: they must adopt various measures to keep personal data safe 
from theft and fraud; they are strictly forbidden from using the data for their 
own commercial purposes; and they are specifically directed to erase the data 
after the retention period.65 Most importantly, national police are allowed to 
access the data only “in specific cases.”66 This provision is designed to prohibit 
data mining—hi-tech fishing expeditions. This falls into line with the emerging 
European trend to prohibit data mining, whether done by the police for 
imperative security reasons or by market actors for less important profit 
motives. The police cannot make blanket requests for calling information. 
Rather, they must compile detailed requests for information on specific 
telephone numbers. The requirement of specificity is a means of guaranteeing 
that the police have at least some grounds for suspecting those telephone 
numbers of being involved in a criminal conspiracy.  
If specificity is combined with other legal checks on national authorities, 
the threat to privacy will be diminished considerably. For instance, the draft 
legislation on Third Pillar data protection might be amended to contain a 
warrant requirement for access to personal data.67 A new measure guaranteeing 
                                                 
 
64  Council Directive, art 10 (cited in note 2). 
65  Id, art 7. 
66  Id, art 4. 
67  See Note from Council Presidency to Multidisciplinary Group on Organised Crime, Council Doc 
6450/1/06 (Mar 23, 2006), available online at <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/mar/eu-
dp-coun-draft-pos-6450-rev1-06.pdf> (visited Apr 21, 2007). As the proposal currently stands, 
the police would have to provide a “factual indication” that personal data will help investigate or 
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data protection in the work of intelligence agencies—not covered by the Third 
Pillar legislation—would also be welcome.  
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS: PROTECTING RIGHTS IN CRIME-
FIGHTING INITIATIVES 
The sharing of personal data among national police authorities—and the 
countervailing need for data protection—is but one of many examples of the 
rapidly growing field of European cooperation on criminal matters.68 What light 
can the experience with data privacy in the Data Retention Directive shed on the 
protection of fundamental rights more generally in the European Union’s 
emerging system of criminal justice?  
One of the most impressive aspects of the Council’s bid to mandate a 
massive system of data collection was the publicity and the quality of the 
legislative debate. But that debate was achieved largely in spite of, not because 
of, EU law. The decision to go forward under the First Pillar was disputed. A 
plausible argument could be made that having different police regulations on 
data retention across Europe imposes significant costs on pan-European 
communications providers and that harmonization of such regulations was 
necessary for economic reasons. But a provision on the conditions of national 
police access to the retained data, even as minimal a provision as was included in 
the Directive, was highly questionable. Objectively speaking, police access was a 
Third Pillar matter. Similarly, it was doubtful that the Data Protection 
Supervisor’s opinion was his to give. The legislation under which the Data 
Protection Supervisor was established was aimed at guaranteeing privacy in the 
data processing operations of the European Community’s own institutions. It 
was not directed at protecting privacy at the national level. 
The mismatch between what is good—for rights and democracy—and 
what is the law is an artifact of the European Union’s idiosyncratic historical 
trajectory. The European Union is proving to be the nation-state in reverse 
chronology. The functions that the nation-state developed first—protection 
from physical violence—the European Union is acquiring last. Those functions 
that the nation-state acquired last—administrative regulation of complex 
markets—the European Union took on first. Because nation-states have been 
reluctant to cede sovereignty over their core protection functions, these matters 
                                                                                                                              
prevent a crime but would not have to go before an independent government officer. See 
Proposal for Protection of Personal Data in Criminal Matters, art 5 (cited in note 2). 
68  For a comprehensive list of such initiatives as of March 23, 2004, see Statewatch, Statewatch’s 
“Scoreboard” on the Threats to Civil Liberties and Privacy in EU Terrorism Plans, (Mar 2004), available 
online at <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/mar/21eu-terr-scoreboard.htm> (visited Apr 
21, 2007). 
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are governed by the Third Pillar. Yet precisely because tools of coercion are 
necessary to keep public order, classic liberal rights are especially important in 
this area of government activity. Decisions concerning the criminal justice 
system should not be secretive. And they should not be made by national 
ministries of the interior acting alone, as is largely the case when decision-
making power rests with the Council. While the bureaucratic mission of 
protecting public security is all-important, it can also be blindsiding. Other 
public servants, attentive to other public values, as well as ordinary citizens, 
should take part in the process.  
At this stage, it is probably too much to ask for the Third Pillar to be 
amended out of existence.69 The data retention experience, however, suggests a 
more modest reform that would render debates on criminal cooperation more 
public and that would encourage a more balanced, rights-attentive approach to 
legislation: a human rights analogue to the data protection authorities. An EU 
human rights body, with advisory powers over Third Pillar initiatives, would 
improve the emerging criminal justice system. Such a government body would 
bring a wealth of national experience to bear on Europe-wide cooperation. 
Through its organization—which would probably take the form of a network of 
national ombudsmen and human rights advocates—it would render the 
Council’s initiatives more visible at the national level. The agency’s opinions 
would focus public attention on Third Pillar proposals and their flaws. And this 
human rights watchdog would improve the European Parliament’s contribution 
on Third Pillar matters: the Parliament could use the watchdog’s opinions as a 
point of departure in exercising its power of consultation.  
This suggestion is not novel. On February 15, 2007, after over two years of 
legislative debate, a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
(“Agency”) was established.70 It is charged with gathering data and conducting 
studies on rights abuses in the Member States, with the aim of promoting better 
implementation of existing EU laws and identifying new areas for legislative 
action. The Agency’s powers, however, are limited. It can advise on proposed 
EU laws only if requested to do so by one of the institutions involved in the 
legislative process.71 More to the point of this discussion, the Agency has power 
only over First Pillar matters, not over criminal justice matters in the Third 
                                                 
69  The Constitutional Treaty would have abolished the European Union’s pillar structure. In doing 
so, it would have extended the more transparent and democratic procedures of the First Pillar to 
criminal cooperation initiatives currently in the Third Pillar. It is unlikely, however, that the 
Constitutional Treaty will be ratified any time soon.  
70  Council Regulation No 168/2007 of 15 February establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2007 OJ (L 53) 1.    
71  Id, art 4.2. 
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Pillar.72 Yet the involvement of rights advocates in the drafting of the Data 
Retention Directive demonstrates precisely how valuable their advice can be for 
proposed criminal legislation in the Third Pillar.  
Indeed, in the debates over the shape of the future agency, a number of 
participants took the view that the Agency should exercise such powers. The 
Select Committee on the European Union of the UK House of Lords released a 
report recommending that the Agency’s mandate be extended to reviewing 
proposed laws in the Third Pillar.73 From the very beginning, the Commission 
proposed that the Agency should have powers both in the First and the Third 
Pillars.74 Yet to secure a deal among the Member States sitting in the Council, 
the Third Pillar component of the legislative package was dropped at the 
eleventh hour.75 A handful of Member States were adamantly opposed to giving 
the Agency prerogatives over such a sensitive area of national sovereignty and 
were determined to use their veto power to block the initiative.  
Going forward, the positive experience of the Data Retention Directive 
should be kept in mind. The founding charter of the Agency will undoubtedly be 
amended in the future, at which time the issue of powers will be revisited. The 
protection of the right to privacy in the Data Retention Directive demonstrates 
that human rights scrutiny can be extremely valuable and that it can work on 
Third Pillar matters when basic rights come under pressure from the police, 
prosecutors, and the courts.  
                                                 
72  Id, arts 2, 3.  
73  See House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Human Rights Protection in Europe: 
The Fundamental Rights Agency, 29th Report of Session 2005–2006, HL Paper 155 ¶ 80 (Apr 4, 
2006). 
74  Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights and Proposal for a Council Decision empowering the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights to pursue its activities in areas referred to in Title VI of the Treaty on 
European Union, COM (2005) 280 final.  
75  See Note from President to Council, Council Doc 16108/06 at 4 (Nov 29, 2006), available online 
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